Abstract-Channel gains are frequently used to obtain a secret key that can be used for encryption in physical layer security systems. However, the channel gains captured by the nodes may not always be the same due to channel estimation errors. This would result in a non-zero key error rate (KER). In this letter, we obtain theoretical expressions for KER in orthogonal frequency division multiplexing systems. Tight KER approximations are provided based on Gauss-Laguerre quadrature. A measurementbased study is conducted by using software defined radio nodes to demonstrate the validity and the practicality of the provided results.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS medium has security vulnerabilities towards passive attacks such as eavesdropping, due to its broadcast nature. A security solution against such attacks is to use encryption/decryption mechanisms that rely on a bit sequence referred to as the secret key [1] . This key needs to be available at the legitimate transmitter node and receiver node. Even though encryption solutions can provide a reliable protection, generation of the key and maintaining its randomness comes at a high cost of computational complexity. Key-sharing algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman are frequently used for this purpose [2] . Enabled by the channel reciprocity property [3] , physical layer (PHY) security techniques provide a new perspective for key generation. This property relies on the reversible nature of electromagnetic waves, ensuring observation of similar channel gains (the amplitudes of channel coefficients) between two nodes. Spatially distinct users encounter distinct wireless channel gains (or other characteristics), that can be used to generate secret keys. This approach is referred to as PHY key generation. The randomness of wireless channel provides continuous and unpredictably changing key characteristics. PHY key generation is significantly less complex than the classical key-sharing algorithms. In fact, it merely introduces a quantization process as the channel needs to be tracked for data communication in any case. The basic secret key generation model is set between two nodes, Alice and Bob. Each node uses PHY information to generate a secret key. If their keys match, then they can securely communicate. However, even one bit key mismatch would disrupt communication. Therefore, bit error rate (BER) becomes insufficient to measure the system performance and the key error rate (KER) needs to be considered. Even in the presence of reciprocal channels, the channel estimates in reallife can be erroneous due to channel estimation error, leading to non-zero KER values.
In order to properly assess the performance of PHY key generation systems, KER needs to be accurately modeled. With this objective, we consider the system model illustrated in Fig. 1 . Both Alice and Bob will capture channel coefficients possibly with some variations due to channel estimation errors. We feed channel gains to a uniform quantizer, as frequently used in [4] . Both nodes utilize the same quantizer, with the quantization interval . Quantized gains can be used to generate secret keys. Our proposed system considers raw key extraction which constitute a baseline for KER, and can be reduced through information reconciliation. Our contributions are:
• Theoretical KER expressions in presence of channel estimation error is derived considering complex Gaussian channels. The results are extended to orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) scheme that is frequently used in current communication standards.
• Tight approximations to KER expressions are obtained by using Marcum-Q functions and Gauss-Laguerre quadrature (GLQ).
• Numerical results are given to verify the theoretical expressions. The tightness of the provided approximations are shown.
• Software defined radio (SDR) based tests are conducted to demonstrate the validity and the real-life applicability of the obtained KER expressions. Related Works: As received signal strength (RSS) measurements are already available in wireless devices, they are frequently used to generate a secret key [5] . Another related source for key generation is the channel gain [6] . Channel gain is advantageous especially due to its simple acquisition (as in 2162-2345 c 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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RSS) and rapid variations, improving the randomness of secret keys. But the correlation between channel gains needs to be carefully considered. In [7] , the correlation between reciprocal channels are theoretically modeled. KER expressions are not yet derived in the literature, and the majority of the available results depend on empirical measurements [8] . Phases of the channel coefficients also show reciprocal characteristics, but their acquisition requires complex systems that are tightly synchronized.
Notation: X ∼ CN (ν, σ 2 ) refers to a random variable X, which follows a complex Gaussian distribution with mean ν and variance σ 2 . · represents the floor function. erfc(·)
expresses the complementary error function. R ∼ R ν, σ 2 represents the Rice distribution for statistically independent
When ν = 0 we obtain the Rayleigh distribution
II. KEY ERROR RATE We consider a two-way OFDM system composed of N subcarriers. The channel estimates are obtained in a time division duplex mode. As indicated in [7] , in order to obtain channel reciprocity, we assume that sampling time difference between two nodes is smaller than the coherence time. As in [9] , we denote the parallel channel corresponding to the n th OFDM subcarrier by H n , for n = 0, . . . , N − 1. We consider complex Gaussian channels, where
Despite the channel reciprocity assumption, Alice and Bob may estimate channel coefficients in erroneous forms. Let the estimated channel coefficient at Alice and Bob be respectively represented byĤ n,1 andĤ n,2 , wherê
for k = 1, 2. In the literature, the estimation error is modeled as complex normal distributed, where e n,k ∼ CN (0, σ 2 e,k ) [10] . Assuming a uniform quantizer with a step size , an estimated channel gain |Ĥ n,k | is mapped to the l th quantization interval I l , where l n = |Ĥ n,1 | , and I l = [l n , (l n + 1) ]. If both estimates are located in the same interval, their decisions and eventually key bits would be the same. For a given estimate of the n th subcarrier's channel at Alice (Ĥ n,1 ), the corresponding channel estimate at Bob becomeŝ H n,2 =Ĥ n,1 −e n,1 +e n,2 . In this conditional case, the amplitude ofĤ n,2 follows Rice distribution with parameters |Ĥ n,2 | ∼
Hence, we can obtain the probability that |Ĥ n,2 | is located in I l interval as
where, P l represents the probability that the quantizer outputs of the two estimated channel gains are the same for a given H n,1 . I 0 (·) denotes the modified Bessel function of the first kind and the first order Marcum-Q function is represented by Q 1 (·, ·). If we denote the first estimated channel gain |Ĥ n,1 | as y, the key matching probability for a single subcarrier, P c , becomes
where f Y (y) denotes the probability density function (pdf) of the corresponding channel model. Considering the complete set of independently fading subcarriers, the key matching probability becomes P o = P N c , and the KER becomes KER = 1 − P o . For Rice distributed channel gains, where
. We obtain P c as given in Eq. (4), as shown at the bottom of this page. For Rayleigh fading channel gains, we set ν = 0, where I 0 (0) = 1.
For notational convenience, let us define,
where α =
. The difference in Eq. (2) corresponds to g(α, β 1 , β 2 , 0) when ν = 0. In order to provide a closed form approximation to the exact KER expression in Eq. (4), we can use a tight approximation to g(α, β 1 , β 2 , 0) as
where β 1 ≤ α < β 2 , due to the definition of the interval I l . This closed form function depends on the condition of whether one of the input values are zero [11] . Tight approximations of Q 1 (α, β) can be conditioned on β ≤ α or β ≥ α [12] . Therefore, we use two different tight approximations for Q 1 (α, β 1 ) and Q 1 (α, β 2 ) as shown in Eq. (7a) and Eq. (7b), as shown at the bottom of this page, and replace the
The key matching probability for a single subcarrier can now be expressed as The GLQ can now be used to obtain a tight approximation to Eq. (8) as
. The degree of the polynomial, M, denotes the number of considered terms. As M → ∞, the approximation becomes an equality [13] . 
Here, , ν, σ , σ e,1 and σ e,2 are the critical parameters affecting the KER value. A larger would reduce KER, whereas larger standard deviations of the channel estimation errors (σ e,1 , σ e,2 ), would increase KER.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS 10 8 Monte Carlo iterations are run based on the theoretical model expressed in Eq. (1). First, the non-zero mean complex Gaussian reciprocal channel coefficients are generated. Their gains follow Rice distribution. Different K-factor values are considered, where K = ν 2 2σ 2 . Then, estimation errors are generated as zero mean complex Gaussian random variables with standard deviations σ e,1 , σ e,2 . Erroneous channel estimates are then quantized. Finally, assigned quantization levels are considered as keys and the KER values are obtained.
As the channel estimate error variance could be more dynamic in real-life, we consider a fixed with varying σ e values, and observe the impact of σ e . It can be seen from Fig. 2 that KER decreases as this ratio increases. In addition to joint estimation error, the
ratio is an important factor. Nodes of different capabilities (such as base stations or user equipments) may have different channel estimation error variances due to practical impairments, such as the noise figure in RF amplifiers. To investigate a diverse set of use-cases, we consider three different scenarios. In the first scenario, we consider perfect channel knowledge at Alice while Bob estimates the channel erroneously ( = 100), channel estimation error on Alice is more severe than that of Bob. It can be seen that increasing Rice channel. We select 3 different K-factor values as 0,1 and 20 to test KER, as shown in Fig. 2 and ν values reduce KER. The ratio of the quantization interval to the joint channel estimation error (σ e ) determines the robustness of the quantization against estimation errors.
IV. TESTBED DESCRIPTION AND
MEASUREMENT RESULTS USRP NI-2921 kits are used as SDR nodes in the test environment, along with LabVIEW software. The testbed of the implementation of point to point OFDM system is shown in Fig. 3 . 360 subcarriers are transmitted by using a discrete Fourier transform of size of 480. The residual positions are zero padded. Quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) is selected in tests, the carrier frequency is selected as 2.45 GHz. Transmission rate is 1 MS/sec and the cyclic prefix length is set to 120 samples. As the synchronization source NI PXI-6683 module is used. This module provides 10 MHz synchronization clock source from a GPS receiver that is connected to the master clock. The external clock signal is shared with the transmitter and the receiver nodes over the cable. At the receiver node, zero forcing approach is used for channel estimation. The overall transmission of a packet is completed in approximately 0.012 ms, consistent with the measurement studies in the literature to observe channel reciprocity [7] , [14] . Keys are extracted every second. All subcarriers are used as pilot symbols in order to avoid any additional channel estimation error through the use of interpolation. As shown in Fig. 3 , USRP node Alice is used as transmitter and USRP node Bob is used as receiver. Then, their roles are reversed. Transmission on both ways is repeated 1000 times. The distance between nodes is set to 50 cm. Fig. 4 shows reciprocal channel gain histograms corresponding to first subcarriers and their estimated pdfs. Their distributions and K-factors slightly differ. The main reason for this variation is the estimation errors on both sides, along with the receiver front-end imperfections. The amplitudes of the estimated channel gain coefficients are quantized and KER values are measured for different values. KER measurements are compared with theoretical KER values from Eq. (9) as given in Table I (where the channel estimation error variances are estimated as σ e = 0.005 and (σ e,1 /σ e,2 = 1). Due to the distribution of the channel coefficients, the slightest change in affects KER significantly. The results show that KER can be accurately estimated through the provided expression.
In order to test the validity of the proposed approach, recorded coefficients are used as a reference for the system model given in Section II. The K-factor shown in Fig. 5 indicates that the reference channel gain estimates follow Rice distribution (K = 1.31). We generate complex Gaussian estimation errors and add them to recorded channel coefficients. Theoretical KER values are compared with the obtained KER values for the same set of parameters in Fig. 5 . The slight difference between measurement and theoretical results are caused due to the erroneous channel coefficients, captured during transmissions. These results demonstrate the accuracy and the practicality of the obtained KER expressions. The obtained expression is critical to analyze the impact of the system parameters. KER can be further reduced by using information reconciliation techniques.
V. CONCLUSION KER expressions are derived for complex Gaussian channels in presence of estimation errors. Theoretical expressions are verified by simulations. SDR based measurements demonstrate the applicability of the results.
